Hospital Prices Grew Substantially Faster Than Physician Prices For Hospital-Based Care In 2007-14.

Evidence suggests that growth in providers' prices drives growth in health care spending on the privately insured. However, existing work has not systematically differentiated between the growth rate of hospital prices and that of physician prices. We analyzed growth in both types of prices for inpatient and hospital-based outpatient services using actual negotiated prices paid by insurers. We found that in the period 2007-14 hospital prices grew substantially faster than physician prices. For inpatient care, hospital prices grew 42 percent, while physician prices grew 18 percent. Similarly, for hospital-based outpatient care, hospital prices grew 25 percent, while physician prices grew 6 percent. A majority of the growth in payments for inpatient and hospital-based outpatient care was driven by growth in hospital prices, not physician prices. Our work suggests that efforts to reduce health care spending should be primarily focused on addressing growth in hospital rather than physician prices. Policy makers should consider a range of options to address hospital price growth, including antitrust enforcement, administered pricing, the use of reference pricing, and incentivizing referring physicians to make more cost-efficient referrals.

Variation In Health Spending Growth For The Privately Insured From 2007 To 2014.

We examined the growth in health spending on people with employer-sponsored private insurance in the period 2007-14. Our analysis relied on information from the Health Care Cost Institute data set, which includes insurance claims from Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare. In the study period private health spending per enrollee grew 16.9 percent, while growth in Medicare spending per fee-for-service beneficiary decreased 1.2 percent. There was substantial variation in private spending growth rates across hospital referral regions (HRRs): Spending in HRRs in the tenth percentile of private spending growth grew at 0.22 percent per year, while HRRs in the ninetieth percentile experienced 3.45 percent growth per year. The correlation between the growth in HRR-level private health spending and growth in fee-for-service Medicare spending in the study period was only 0.211. The low correlation across HRRs suggests that different factors may be driving the growth in spending on the two populations.

THE PRICE AIN'T RIGHT? HOSPITAL PRICES AND HEALTH SPENDING ON THE PRIVATELY INSURED.

We use insurance claims data covering 28% of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance in the United States to study the variation in health spending on the privately insured, examine the structure of insurer-hospital contracts, and analyze the variation in hospital prices across the nation. Health spending per privately insured beneficiary differs by a factor of three across geographic areas and has a very low correlation with Medicare spending. For the privately insured, half of the spending variation is driven by price variation across regions, and half is driven by quantity variation. Prices vary substantially across regions, across hospitals within regions, and even within hospitals. For example, even for a nearly homogeneous service such as lower-limb magnetic resonance imaging, about a fifth of the total case-level price variation occurs within a hospital in the cross section. Hospital market structure is strongly associated with price levels and contract structure. Prices at monopoly hospitals are 12% higher than those in markets with four or more rivals. Monopoly hospitals also have contracts that load more risk on insurers (e.g., they have more cases with prices set as a share of their charges). In concentrated insurer markets the opposite occurs-hospitals have lower prices and bear more financial risk. Examining the 366 mergers and acquisitions that occurred between 2007 and 2011, we find that prices increased by over 6% when the merging hospitals were geographically close (e.g., 5 miles or less apart), but not when the hospitals were geographically distant (e.g., over 25 miles apart).

Retail Clinic Visits For Low-Acuity Conditions Increase Utilization And Spending.

Retail clinics have been viewed by policy makers and insurers as a mechanism to decrease health care spending, by substituting less expensive clinic visits for more expensive emergency department or physician office visits. However, retail clinics may actually increase spending if they drive new health care utilization. To assess whether retail clinic visits represent new utilization or a substitute for more expensive care, we used insurance claims data from Aetna for the period 2010-12 to track utilization and spending for eleven low-acuity conditions. We found that 58 percent of retail clinic visits for low-acuity conditions represented new utilization and that retail clinic use was associated with a modest increase in spending, of $14 per person per year. These findings do not support the idea that retail clinics decrease health care spending.

Free to Choose? Reform, Choice, and Consideration Sets in the English National Health Service.

Choice in public services is controversial. We exploit a reform in the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more responsive to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of demand faced by hospitals increased substantially post- reform and we find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality.

Competition policy in health care markets: navigating the enforcement and policy maze.

US health care is in ferment. Private entities are merging, aligning, and coordinating in a wide array of configurations. At the same time, there is a great deal of policy change. This includes the federal government's Affordable Care Act, as well as actions by Medicare, state legislatures, and state agencies. The health system is built upon markets, which determine how (and how well) goods and services are delivered to consumers, so it is critical that these markets work as well as possible. As the primary federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are charged with ensuring that health care markets operate well, but they are not alone. The functioning of health care markets is also profoundly affected by other parts of the federal government (notably the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) and by state legislation and regulation. In this current period of such dynamic change, it is particularly important for the antitrust agencies to continue and enhance their communication and coordination with other government agencies as well as to maintain vigilant antitrust enforcement and consumer protection in health care markets.

Trends underlying employer-sponsored health insurance growth for Americans younger than age sixty-five.

Little is known about the trends in health care spending for the 156 million Americans who are younger than age sixty-five and enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance. Using a new source of health insurance claims data, we estimated per capita spending, utilization, and prices for this population between 2007 and 2011. During this period per capita spending on employer-sponsored insurance grew at historically slow rates, but still faster than per capita national health expenditures. Total per capita spending for employer-sponsored insurance grew at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent, with prescription spending growing at 3.3 percent and medical spending growing at 5.3 percent. Out-of-pocket medical spending increased at an average annual rate of 8.0 percent, whereas out-of-pocket prescription drug spending growth was flat. Growth in the use of medical services and prescription drugs slowed. Medical price growth accelerated, and prescription price growth decelerated. As a result, changes in utilization contributed less than changes in price did to overall spending growth for those with employer-sponsored insurance.

Can governments do it better? Merger mania and hospital outcomes in the English NHS.

The literature on mergers between private hospitals suggests that such mergers often produce little benefit. Despite this, the UK government has pursued an active policy of hospital mergers, arguing that such consolidations will bring improvements for patients. We examine whether this promise is met. We exploit the fact that between 1997 and 2006 in England around half the short term general hospitals were involved in a merger, but that politics means that selection for a merger may be random with respect to future performance. We examine the impact of mergers on a large set of outcomes including financial performance, productivity, waiting times and clinical quality and find little evidence that mergers achieved gains other than a reduction in activity. Given that mergers reduce the scope for competition between hospitals the findings suggest that further merger activity may not be the appropriate way of dealing with poorly performing hospitals.

The effect of a hospital nurse staffing mandate on patient health outcomes: evidence from California's minimum staffing regulation.

We evaluate the impact of California Assembly Bill 394, which mandated maximum levels of patients per nurse in the hospital setting. When the law was passed, some hospitals already met the requirements, while others did not. Thus changes in staffing ratios from the pre- to post-mandate periods are driven in part by the legislation. We find persuasive evidence that AB394 had the intended effect of decreasing patient/nurse ratios in hospitals that previously did not meet mandated standards. However, these improvements in staffing ratios do not appear to be associated with relative improvements in measured patient safety in affected hospitals.

Can competition improve outcomes in UK health care? Lessons from the past two decades.

UK governments of all political colours have sought to improve productivity in health care by introducing pro-competitive reforms in the National Health Service (NHS) during the last two decades. The first wave of reform operated from 1991 to 1997. The second wave was introduced in England only in the mid 2000s. In 2010, further reform in England, intended to increase the extent of competition, was proposed by the Coalition administration. But the effect of competition on productivity in health care and in particular on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. This paper reviews the evidence, focusing on robust and recent evidence, on the use of competition as a mechanism for improving quality. The consensus is that competition will increase quality in health care, but that institutional details matter. Given this, we end by discussing whether the current plans to make the buyers of care family doctors and other professionals and to allow some local price variation are likely to be beneficial in the UK context of full public funding for health care.

Trends in retail clinic use among the commercially insured.

OBJECTIVES: To describe trends in retail clinic use among commercially insured patients and to identify which patient characteristics predict retail clinic use. STUDY DESIGN: Retrospective cohort analysis of commercial insurance claims sampled from a population of 13.3 million patients in 22 markets in 2007 to 2009. METHODS: We identified 11 simple acute conditions that can be managed at a retail clinic and described trends in retail clinic utilization for these conditions. We used multiple logistic regressions to identify predictors of retail clinic versus another care site for these conditions and assessed whether those predictors changed over time. RESULTS: Retail clinic use increased 10-fold from 2007 to 2009. By 2009, 6.9% of all visits for the 11 conditions were to a retail clinic. Proximity to a retail clinic was the strongest predictor of use. Patients living within 1 mile of a retail clinic were 7.5% more likely to use one than those living 10 to 20 miles away (P <.001). Women (+0.9%, P <.001), young adults (+1.6%, P <.001), patients without a chronic condition (+0.9%, P <.001), and patients with high incomes (+2.6%, P <.001) were more likely to use retail clinics. All these associations became stronger over time. There was no association between primary care physician availability and retail clinic use. CONCLUSIONS: If these trends continue, health plans will see a dramatic increase in retail clinic utilization. While use is increasing on average, it is particularly increasing among young, healthy, and higher income patients living close to retail clinics.

Hospital prices and market structure in the hospital and insurance industries.

There has been substantial consolidation among health insurers and hospitals, recently, raising questions about the effects of this consolidation on the exercise of market power. We analyze the relationship between insurer and hospital market concentration and the prices of hospital services. We use a national US dataset containing transaction prices for health care services for over 11 million privately insured Americans. Using three years of panel data, we estimate how insurer and hospital market concentration are related to hospital prices, while controlling for unobserved market effects. We find that increases in insurance market concentration are significantly associated with decreases in hospital prices, whereas increases in hospital concentration are non-significantly associated with increases in prices. A hypothetical merger between two of five equally sized insurers is estimated to decrease hospital prices by 6.7%.

Why don't courts treat hospitals like tanks for liquefied gases? Some reflections on health care antitrust enforcement.

In this article, I use the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 2004 report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition as an occasion to comment on two specific issues that have arisen in health care antitrust: the recent string of losses by the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases and an antitrust exemption for physicians to bargain collectively with health insurers. One of the more salient facts about health care antitrust enforcement is the notable recent lack of success of the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases. This may be due to judges and juries holding views of hospital markets as being different from markets for other goods and services. My conclusion is that hospitals are an industry with unique attributes, but nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry. Countervailing power is an issue that has come to the fore in health care antitrust. Physicians have explicitly asked for legislative exemption from the antitrust laws in order to bargain collectively with insurance companies, as a means of counteracting insurers' monopsony power. It is not clear that health insurers possess significant monopsony power. Even if they do, bestowing monopoly power on physicians will not necessarily improve matters. Active antitrust enforcement in insurance markets is the correct response, not blanket exemptions for providers.

Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? Ownership form and the evolution of the US hospital industry.

We examine the evolving structure of the US hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all US hospitals from 1984 to 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits.

How do households choose their employer-based health insurance?

Using the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, this study estimates a model of household demand for employer-based health insurance to investigate the set of plan and household characteristics that influence coverage choices. Overall, we find that households are sensitive to price with respect to their coverage decisions, and that price sensitivity varies by marital status, wealth, and the number of offers of employer coverage available to the household. We also find that lower-income households are less likely to select an option that provides coverage for all household members. Using our model estimates, we simulate the effect of employers offering various levels of "opt-out" payments on changes in workers' probabilities of not taking up coverage and on expected costs.

Competition among hospitals.

We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 face an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals face less elastic demand and act as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices are lower than those of for-profits, but markups are higher. We simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains. In San Luis Obispo County, where the merger creates a near monopoly, prices rise by up to 53%, and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains not-for-profit.